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 Abstract
We study the impact of the integration of women in US policing between the late 1970s 
and early 1990s on violent crime reporting and domestic violence escalation. Along 
these two key dimensions, we find that female officers improved police quality. Using 
crime victimization data, we find that as female representation increases among officers 
in an area, violent crimes against women in that area, and especially domestic violence, 
are reported to the police at significantly higher rates. There are no such effects for 
violent crimes against men or from increases in the female share among civilian police 
employees. Furthermore, we find evidence that female officers help prevent the esca-
lation of domestic violence. Increases in female officer representation are followed by 
significant declines in intimate partner homicide rates and in rates of repeated domestic 
abuse. These effects are all consistent between fixed effects models with controls for 
economic and policy variables and models that focus exclusively on increases in female 
police employment driven by externally imposed affirmative action plans resulting 
from employment discrimination cases.
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“I definitely think they need more female officers and every crime scene should have a 
female officer. Not to be left alone with a male officer. … It’s all about the approach by 
the police.” 
- Female assault victim quoted in Spohn and Tellis (2012; p. 400). 
I. Introduction 
Although law enforcement remains a male-dominated occupation, a dramatic and lasting 
demographic shift occurred between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Over this period, 
the share of female officers in major US police departments nearly tripled from 3.4% to 
10.1%.
1
This increase in female representation in law enforcement occurred in the wake of 
the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited sex discrimination in employment, 
and during a period in which women increased their labor market participation and newly 
entered several non-traditional occupations (Goldin 2006; Blau, Brummund, and Liu 
2012).  
Even against this backdrop of female progress, women’s integration in law enforcement 
was remarkable. The occupation imposes physical and emotional demands on workers and 
is strongly associated with masculine traits of power, protection and authority. As a result, 
the employment of female officers has been controversial from the start (Martin and Jurik 
2007). Opponents point to the fact that women are, on average, smaller and weaker than 
men to argue that they are less capable at policing. They also argue that incorporating 
female officers in a department undermines unit cohesion and makes male officers less 
productive. The strongest opposition to increasing female representation is directed at 
cases in which it is achieved through the enforcement of employment anti-discrimination 
laws and implementation of affirmative action (AA) plans. In those cases, the particular 
concern is that departments respond to external pressures to include women by lowering 
standards for female applicants, which lowers average officer quality and can itself lead to 
resentment and conflict among officers. Early proponents of female officers argued that 
population-wide sex differences were not relevant to the select sample of individuals who 
sought work in law enforcement and emphasized areas of similarity between the sexes. 
More recently, rather than arguing that female officers are equal substitutes for males, 
advocates for women in policing have argued that women make distinctive contributions 
to police production. In particular, advocates point to police interactions with female 
assault victims, and especially domestic violence victims, as domains in which female 
officers can be especially effective (Lonsway et al. 2003).
2
  
This notion that increasing women’s representation in local law enforcement helps other 
women in their area echoes theories of improved role modeling from greater female 
representation in positions of authority (e.g., Athey, Avery and Zemsky 2000; Carrell, 
 
1 According to data in the Uniform Crime Reports (United States Department of Justice 2009), the average 
female officer share among county and municipal police departments with over 100 officers increased from 
3.4% in 1976 to 10.1% in 1994. Subsequent growth was much slower; by 2011, women represented on 
average only 11.1% of officers at such departments (United States Department of Justice 2011). Table 1 
reports female officer shares in our estimation samples.  
2 Female assault victims often prefer to interact with female officers (as in Spohn and Tellis 2012, quoted 
above). This preference may arise because they find it less difficult to disclose sensitive personal information 
to female, as opposed to male, officers. It may also reflect differences in how male and female officers interact 
with female victims (Buzawa and Buzawa 1996).  
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Page and West 2010).
3
 It also echoes political science theories of representative 
bureaucracy that increasing minority representation among civil servants helps the 
minority population (Keiser et al. 2002; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). The notion is 
also reflected in arguments by organizations such as the National Organization for 
Women for promoting women in positions of power in all spheres: economic, political, 
cultural, and within government bureaucracies. Their aim is not only to address past 
discrimination but to “effect change in these institutions from within.”4    
This research addresses the controversy by providing empirical evidence on the effects 
of the integration of female officers between the 1970s and 1990s on the quality of local 
policing. Motivated by arguments about the potential advantages of female officers in 
handling violent crimes against women and domestic violence, we define our two primary 
quality measures as the rates at which these crimes are reported to police and the rate of 
escalation of domestic violence. In order to capture effects on overall officer quality and 
to detect tradeoffs between improving policing for different groups of victims, we also test 
for effects on other crimes and victims. Our estimation approach involves two phases. In 
the first, we study all changes in the female shares among police officers, while in the 
second we build on the results of Miller and Segal (2012) and focus on increases in female 
representation induced by externally imposed AA plans. Using these two approaches 
allows us to accomplish two goals. First, we can provide stronger causal evidence about 
the effects of female integration, and second, we can examine whether or not it matters 
how female integration is achieved.  
Our analysis begins with a quality measure based on the rate at which crimes are 
reported to police. Because crime reporting is an essential input into the production of law 
enforcement services, underreporting of crimes is a major policy concern. In particular, 
violent crimes against women are thought to be severely underreported to police (Tjaden 
and Thoennes 2006) and increased reporting rates for these crimes is one of the key 
achievements cited by the White House in assessing progress on the issue since the 1994 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA; Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Public Law 103-322).
5
 Furthermore, crime-reporting rates 
provide a gauge for the degree of trust that people in an area have in their local police and 
proxy for their assessment of police quality. 
Increased reporting of domestic violence and more effective police handling of reported 
cases should in turn reduce escalation rates of domestic violence. Crime incidence will 
decrease if potential offenders are deterred by their greater chances of incurring police 
involvement and criminal penalties or if direct police intervention in households with 
abuse changes the behavior of offenders or victims. However, because increased reporting 
will inflate official crime statistics for most crimes (and paradoxically appear to lower 
police quality), our crime rate measures are either based on direct victimization data or 
limited to homicides, where non-reporting is not a concern.
6
 Specifically, we measure 
domestic violence escalation using intimate partner homicide rates and longitudinal 
victimization survey data on repeated incidents of domestic violence. 
 
3  In our context, female officers may serve as role models of a sort for female assaults victims, 
demonstrating to them that women need not be powerless.  
4  Quoted from the National Organization for Women’s 1998 Declaration of Sentiments, online at 
http://www.now.org/organization/conference/1998/vision98.html. 
5  See, for example the “Factsheet: The Violence Against Women Act” made available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf (downloaded August 18, 2013) 
following the March 7, 2013 re-authorization of the Act. 
6 The exception is in Online Appendix Table 6A, where the outcomes are rapes and assaults reported to 
police. Notwithstanding our concerns about reporting bias in police data, we consider these other outcomes for 
completeness. 
3 
 
Our empirical analysis reveals that increasing the female share of officers improves the 
quality of policing for both of our primary quality measures. First, we find evidence that 
higher shares of female officers in an area increase the reporting rates of violent crimes 
against women in that area.
7
 Such effects are absent for male victims; there are also no 
increases in reporting arising from growth in the female share of civilian police 
employees.
8
 Second, we find that increasing female officer representation prevents 
domestic violence escalation. Specifically, we find that higher local shares of female 
officers lower the probability of future domestic violence following incidents of abuse and 
reduce subsequent intimate partner homicide rates for female victims. We also find 
reductions of intimate partner homicide rates for male victims, as do studies of domestic 
violence policy changes (Iyengar 2009; Aizer and Dal Bó 2009). The literature attributes 
these effects for male victims to a reduction in the number of cases of battered women 
killing their abusers. All of our models include location and year fixed effects, as well as 
controls for local area economic, social and policy changes (including schooling, labor 
force participation and the female share in non-traditional occupations). Our findings are 
also all consistent between the direct approach based on female employment shares and 
the approach based on AA exposure. 
Our results contribute to the economics of crime literature on domestic violence by 
analyzing the role of police demographics and by introducing the novel outcome measures 
of crime reporting and repeated domestic abuse. Previous research considers the effects of 
policies mandating arrest (Iyengar 2009) or prosecution (Aizer and Dal Bó 2009) in 
domestic violence cases and the impact of states’ adoption of unilateral divorce laws (Dee 
2003; Stevenson and Wolfers 2006). Domestic violence rates are also shown to be 
elevated by higher gender pay gaps (Aizer 2010), higher unemployment rates (Tertilt and 
van den Berg 2012), and unexpected football losses (Card and Dahl 2011).  
Outside of the issue of domestic violence, this paper also contributes to the literature on 
the effects of police staffing and policies on crime outcomes. Much of that literature 
focuses on the size of the police force to measure deterrence effects (Levitt 1997; 
McCrary and Chalfin 2013). Studies also evaluate particular innovations in police practice, 
such as the use of information technology (Garicano and Heaton 2010) and DNA 
databases (Doleac 2011). By studying the sex composition of the force, we consider an 
unexamined dimension of police staffing on crime outcomes. Our interest in the effects of 
changing police demographic characteristics is shared with studies that relate officer race 
and ethnicity to arrest rates for different demographic groups (e.g., Donohue and Levitt 
2001; Antonovics and Knight 2009). However, unlike that literature, which is primarily 
concerned with relationships between officers and suspected offenders, this paper centers 
on interactions between police and victims. That literature also focuses on police behavior 
as the outcome of interest, while our outcomes are victim reporting behavior and crime 
rates.  
Furthermore, in Section 6, we study exogenous variation in police demographics driven 
by employment discrimination litigation and find evidence of positive effects on policing 
quality. Although our previous estimates include both fixed effects and time-varying local 
controls to eliminate the main potential sources of spurious correlations, the AA estimates 
 
7  This finding is consonant with the result in Iyer et al. (2012) relating increased female political 
representation in India to higher rates (per population) of reported violent crimes against women. 
8 To detect tradeoffs in improving policing for different groups of victims and to provide a wider range of 
quality measures, we also investigate the effects of female officer representation on the rates of assaults per 
population against female or male victims (measured using the victimization survey) and the rate of assaults 
and rapes per population reported to the police. As reported in Online Appendix Tables 5A and 6A, we find no 
significant effects. Limitations of these additional outcome measures are discussed in Section 5.2.   
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provide the additional benefit of focusing on increases in female police representation that 
were induced by court interventions. Hence, these estimates do not reflect situations in 
which local police responded to political pressure to increase female representation,
9
 but 
instead focus on situations in which the local police continued to restrict their hiring of 
female officers (even relative to national hiring trends, as indicated by the pre-trend 
Figure 1) and were litigated for ongoing employment discrimination. Previous studies of 
police diversity and crime outcomes that have used AA as a source of variation find mixed 
results. McCrary (2007) studies race and finds no effects on reported crime, arrest, or 
clearance rates. Lott (2000) associates increased diversity in sex or race with higher 
reported crime rates, but that study suffers from well-noted methodological problems.
10
 
Our paper is the first in the AA literature to examine reported and unreported crimes, to 
study reporting as an outcome, and to examine violent crimes against women and intimate 
partner violence.  
Finally, by studying the impact of women’s initial integration in policing, this research 
provides new insight into the economic and social effects of increasing female 
representation in a traditionally male dominated occupation that involves power and 
authority in which women remain underrepresented. The finding that female 
representation in law enforcement has significant effects on policing quality expands on 
previous studies that document significant effects of female representation, whether 
achieved through quotas or driven by changes in market forces alone, in other traditionally 
male dominated occupations, such as political leadership (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; 
Iyer et al. 2012) and business leadership (Matsa and Miller 2011, 2012, 2013).  
The next section provides background and describes hypothesized mechanisms. Section 
3 discusses the main data sources. Section 4 presents the empirical approach and results 
from the analysis of female officers and crime reporting; Section 5 does the same for 
domestic violence escalation. Section 6 presents estimates of the effects of affirmative 
action. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
II. Women in Policing: Background, Identification, and Hypotheses  
A. Initial Integration and Identifying Variation 
Through the 1960s, US local law enforcement officers were almost all male. A small 
number of female officers (or “policewomen”) worked in certain departments, but even 
these select women operated in a limited functional sphere and were often segregated into 
designated Women’s Bureaus.11 They were granted less authority than male officers and 
 
9 The concern about police responding to direct local pressure to hire more women is most problematic for 
our estimates if the pressures to hire female officers occurred in conjunction with pressure to improve 
handling of violence against women. We present two pieces of evidence in the paper for why that is not likely. 
First, during the time period under study, policy advocacy addressing violence against women did not include 
hiring female officers among the desired reforms. Second, using the best available data, we find no significant 
relationships between changes in female officer shares and other police department policies related to 
domestic violence towards the end of our sample period. See Section 4.2 for details.  
10 Specifically, the main outcome variable (crime rate) is included as a control variable in the first-stage 
regression that predicts police diversity. The results for female officers are statistically insignificant when this 
error is corrected; see footnote 22 in Lott (2000) and page 540 in Holzer and Neumark (2000). 
11 Eisenberg (2009) characterizes the “policewoman” job at the Seattle Police Department in the 1950s as 
“social work with a gun and a badge” (p. 17), but also notes that policewomen were involved in a range of 
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were generally barred from patrol duties and opportunities for training and promotion 
(Martin and Jurik 2007). 
Much of this occupational segregation can be explained by the relatively low supply of 
female police officers during the period. Female labor force participation was low overall 
and employed women were mainly concentrated in traditionally feminine occupations 
(Goldin 2002, 2006; Blau, Brummund, and Liu 2012). Law enforcement’s masculine 
associations with power and authority, together with its physical and emotional demands 
and unpleasant and dangerous working conditions, were additional deterrents for most 
women. Nevertheless, even the low supply of potential female officers sometimes 
exceeded demand for their services, and capable women who sought to enter the 
profession often faced opposition from hiring departments and potential coworkers. The 
same stereotypes and beliefs about women’s unsuitability for police work that suppressed 
labor supply created demand side obstacles as well.
12
   
Female integration in US law enforcement started in the 1970s. Our analysis starts in the 
late 1970s, when outcome data are first available, and runs through the early 1990s, before 
the major federal legislation on violence against women. During this period, the female 
share of sworn officers nearly tripled from 3.4% to 10.1%. One likely reason for the 
increase in female representation during our sample period is the shift in gender norms 
and attitudes that increased women’s labor supply overall and especially in non-traditional 
occupations. National laws against employment discrimination likely also contributed. 
The 1963 Equal Pay Act banned pay differences based on sex, Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act prohibited sex discrimination in employment, and the 1972 Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act extended the latter to cover government agencies. Court decisions 
clarified that these protections rendered illegal not only policies that explicitly treat the 
sexes differently, for example, by blocking women from patrol duties or promotion 
competitions, but also policies that have a disparate impact on women (and are not closely 
linked to job performance), such as height and weight standards for hiring (as in Dothard 
v. Rawlinson in 1977; or educational requirements, as in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. in 
1971). Female representation in law enforcement was also advanced through federal 
incentives, such as the requirement in the 1973 Crime Control Act that departments have 
in place Equal Employment Opportunity programs to be eligible for funding. 
The timing and extent of female integration varied across departments, which is what 
enables us to estimate its impact on crime reporting and domestic violence escalation after 
including location and year fixed effects.
13
 We control for changing local factors, such as 
increasing female empowerment and improving economic conditions, and for sub-national 
policy changes that may have coincided with female integration in law enforcement and 
                                                                                                                                                  
activities, such as making drunk-driving arrests, playing undercover roles in sex crime cases, and providing 
security for parades and celebrity appearances. 
12  Although pressures from market competition might be expected to eliminate discriminatory labor 
practices and correct biased perceptions in the private sector (Becker 1957), those pressures are weaker for the 
public sector workforce, and updating of beliefs may be slow if employers have little experience upon which 
to update their beliefs. Of course, even in the private sector and with unlimited experience, statistical 
discrimination can be self-reinforcing (and accurate on average) if employers have low expectations from 
female candidates and women under-invest in relevant (but untested) skills in response (Coate and Loury 
1993). Market competition will also not eliminate discrimination when the source is co-worker tastes, but will 
instead lead to segregation. In policing, male officers frequently resisted having female peers or commanding 
officers (Eisenberg 2009), possibly because a female presence would undermine or “pollute” (Goldin 2002) 
the masculinity and prestige of their occupation. 
13 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the exact timing and depth of the integration of female officers was 
affected by random local shocks in the preferences of police or city leaders, the quality of female candidates, 
and by idiosyncratic catalyzing events, such as a 1968 scandal involving corrupt male vice detectives in 
Seattle (Eisenberg 2009; p. 55).  
6 
 
also affected domestic violence reporting or escalation rates. In our preferred estimation 
approach for violent crime reporting rates, we compare changes between female and male 
victims. In Sections 4 and 5, we use falsification and robustness checks to verify that the 
remaining variation in female representation in our models is exogenous. In Section 6, we 
present estimates based on an alternative approach that exploits plausibly exogenous 
variation in female integration from externally imposed AA following employment 
discrimination cases against particular departments in different years.
14
 Studying AA 
rather than female representation may yield more reliable estimates, but it also has its 
limitations. In particular, the estimates from AA-induced gains may have limited external 
validity for predicting effects of female representation outside of AA because the effects 
of increased female representation achieved specifically through AA may differ from the 
average effects from all causes. This could happen if AA departments were forced to hire 
less qualified women or if they faced more internal resistance from male officers. Hence, 
evidence from each of these approaches is informative in its own right and is an essential 
part of this study.  
B. A Different Shade of Blue? Hypothesized Effects of Female Integration 
Debates about the role of women in policing, both scholarly and popular, frequently 
center on how ability differences between male and female officers affect their modes of 
interaction with suspected offenders. Opponents emphasize that women are smaller and 
physically weaker than men, while proponents argue that they tend to have better social 
and communication skills and are less likely to use force against civilians (for more 
detailed arguments and evidence, see Rabe-Hemp 2008). By contrast, this paper examines 
potential effects of gender differences in interactions not only with crime perpetrators but 
also with their victims. This sub-section describes two hypothesized mechanisms related 
to the interactions between officers and victims by which increases in female officer 
shares can improve policing outcomes for female assault victims and a third potential 
mechanism with ambiguous predictions for policing quality. 
Our first hypothesized mechanism entails female officers employing a distinctive 
approach in their police work. Specifically, we consider the theory that female officers 
have different attitudes about violence against women in general and about domestic 
violence in particular and that they handle these cases differently than do male officers.
15
 
Sex differences in officers’ attitudes regarding domestic violence were likely to have been 
especially important during the time period of our analysis because the criminal justice 
system, as a matter of policy, tended to minimize its importance.
16
 Indeed, a major 
 
14 The history of AA in policing and its proximate impact on employment outcomes is described in more 
detail in McCrary (2007) and Miller and Segal (2012), who show large increases in Black representation in 
law enforcement following these targeted interventions. Miller and Segal (2012) also find smaller, but still 
economically and statistically significant, incremental increases in female police employment in lower-ranked 
officer positions. For excellent summaries of the literature on the effects of AA on employment, see Donohue 
and Heckman (1991), Holzer and Neumark (2000). 
15 Because of the high degree of non-random selection into policing (both self-selection and screening) and 
the pressures felt by many female officers to conform to the masculine police culture, it is unlikely that 
average sex differences in abilities or preferences in the general population (documented in large psychology 
and economics literatures, summarized in Croson and Gneezy 2009) will be mirrored exactly among officers. 
Nevertheless, some gender differences may persist, possibly because of differences in motivation for entering 
the profession: in a recent study, female recruits to the NYPD rated “the opportunity to help people” 
significantly higher than males did (Raganella and White 2004). 
16 This was reflected, for example, in the fact that marital rape was not a crime in any state until 1975 and 
in court decisions such as the 1989 Brooklyn state supreme court case in which Dong Lu Chen was sentenced 
to 5 years of probation after killing his wife (by smashing her skull with a hammer) because she had been 
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objective of the 1994 VAWA was “to encourage States, Indian tribal governments, and 
units of local government to treat domestic violence as a serious violation of criminal law” 
(Public Law 103-322, Section 2101(a)). Individual police officers often viewed domestic 
violence cases negatively and frequently failed to respond to domestic violence calls. 
Newmark, Harrell and Adams’s (1995) evaluation of a successful officer training program 
in Texas found that, even after officers had been trained in how to handle domestic 
violence cases, 15% of surveyed domestic violence victims still reported that law 
enforcement had been called but never arrived.
17
  
Although it is natural to imagine that female officers might react differently in these 
cases, the notion of a female policing style is controversial in the criminology literature. 
Some studies find evidence of gender differences in attitudes and behaviors among police 
officers, particularly relating to domestic violence. For example, Buzawa and Buzawa 
(1996) report that domestic violence victims describe female officers as “more 
understanding, showing more concern, and providing more information about legal rights 
and shelters” (p. 61). However, their review of the literature leads them to conclude that 
the evidence “tentatively supported the existence of attitudinal and behavioral differences” 
between male and female officers but that “this theory is still generally unproven by 
empirical research” (p. 61). More recent studies also report mixed evidence of gender 
differences among officers (Poteyeva and Sun 2009). A distinct feature of our study is that 
it measures the impact of female integration on departments, rather than comparing male 
and female officers in a department at a single point in time. This enables us to also 
capture any spillover effects that female officers have on the attitudes and behavior of 
their male coworkers (analogous to the effects on male colleagues of female judges in 
Boyd, Epstein and Martin 2010 and female corporate directors in Adams and Ferreira 
2009).  
Under this first mechanism, female representation can improve reporting rates directly 
by increasing the likelihood that police respond to victims’ requests for assistance and also 
indirectly by increasing the willingness of victims to contact police. This indirect effect is 
part of our second hypothesized mechanism, which is based on the behavior of crime 
victims.  
Female victims of violent crimes often prefer to discuss the incidents with female rather 
than male officers (e.g., Jordan 2001).
18
  This preference may be a reaction to differences 
in how male and female officers interact with them, but it can exist even if male and 
female officers have similar attitudes and behaviors. Openly discussing the sensitive and 
personal details of a violent crime incident may be especially difficult for female victims 
interacting with male officers. Female assault victims and male and female officers 
                                                                                                                                                  
sexually unfaithful. Police policy also reflected these attitudes. Police training manuals from this period 
contain guidelines for handling domestic violence cases with a minimal level of intervention (e.g., the 1968 
manual for the International Association of Police Chiefs advises police officers that their “sole purpose” is to 
“preserve the peace” and they should attempt to “pacify [the] parties” and use arrest only as “a last resort” and 
the 1974 Oakland police department manual describes the role of the police as more of a “mediator and 
peacemaker” than enforcer of the law). 
17 In a well-known case, the San Jose police department was sued for the wrongful death of Ruth Bunnell, 
who was murdered by her husband: the police did not respond to her call for help, even though she had 
contacted the police 29 times in the prior year. Another widely publicized case was Thurman v. City of 
Torrington, brought by Tracey Thurman against the city police department in Torrington, Connecticut, after 
her abusive husband beat her almost to death in 1983.  
18 Jordan (2001) also reports that women find forensic physical examinations less traumatic when the 
examiner is female. Outside of criminal investigations, there is also evidence of similar gender preferences in 
the medical context, in which female patients often prefer to receive their care (in general, and especially for 
obstetrics and gynecology) from female physicians (Reyes 2006). 
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mention this preference in several interviews reported in Spohn and Tellis (2012).
19
  
Under these two mechanisms, female officers will increase the rates at which violent 
crimes against women are reported to police and the completeness of those reports. The 
increased frequency and depth of crime reporting, together with greater concern and 
action from police officers, should in turn reduce the likelihood of future violent crimes 
against women. There may be general deterrence effects that lower violence against 
women as this type of criminal activity becomes more likely to be punished. There may 
also be reductions in escalating violence for victims of domestic abuse if police 
interventions are effective or lead victims to receive other support services.  
It is worth noting that the second mechanism relies on female victims’ having some 
knowledge of the demographic composition of their local law enforcement. Women may 
learn about their local police through interactions, while reporting a crime or being 
interviewed as a witness or suspect, or through observation. The importance of direct 
interactions for inference about changes in female shares among officers suggests that the 
effect of female officers should be larger for crimes (such as domestic violence assaults) 
in which the same person is likely to be victimized repeatedly. In such cases, victims who 
report incidents to police learn about how the local police respond, and their decision to 
report subsequent incidents (and what information to provide to police) will likely be 
affected by the quality of their previous interactions. Nevertheless, even without previous 
direct interactions with police, women are generally aware of the sex mix around them 
(Castillo, Leo and Petrie 2013) and can observe increases in the female share of officers 
performing routine duties, such as patrolling and responding to complaints, in their area 
(Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Female officers may be especially noticeable because 
their presence is unusual in the male-dominated occupation.   
Separate from these two gender-related mechanisms, female representation could also 
affect law enforcement quality by affecting average police officer quality. If departments 
had been hiring their best candidates through the 1970s regardless of gender, and they 
achieved female integration in the 1980s by lowering standards for female applicants, 
possibly because of external pressure, then average officer quality would drop as more 
women were hired. If, instead, integration resulted from greater supply of highly qualified 
female candidates, then average officer quality would weakly increase. Quality will also 
improve if female integration is achieved by removing discriminatory barriers that cause 
departments to reject women for less capable men.  
Even if officer quality increases, however, ongoing sex discrimination and resistance 
from peers, supervisors, and subordinates can undermine the effectiveness of even highly 
talented female officers. This resistance may be especially problematic for women hired 
or promoted at departments with active affirmative action plans. Because of its different 
predicted impact on officer quality and potential effects on police morale, our analysis of 
AA in Section 6 may not be directly comparable to the analyses in Sections 4 and 5. 
Hence, we argue that both the direct and AA-based estimation approaches are 
independently informative.  
 
19 The examples in Spohn and Tellis (2012) include the quote at the opening of this paper. Another victim 
said, “I don’t feel like men are emotionally equipped to deal with this kind of thing. I don’t see cops as being, 
I mean, I think they try to do the best they can, but they come off as abrasive and ask about your personal life. 
… I think a female officer would be more compassionate and would communicate in a more sensitive 
manner.” (p. 391). One male officer in that study said, “The only part is that being a male [female victims] 
don’t want to discuss every sexual act that happened … so I have to bring in a female.” (p. 232). Female 
officers said, “Being a female, I think that they can relate to me and feel comfortable opening up” (p. 233) and 
“I think that it helps that I am a female in terms of dealing with the victims but it hurts when dealing with the 
suspect. … It helps being a soft-spoken female. I tell them I’m not there to judge…” (p. 224). 
9 
 
Our empirical analysis is focused on testing the predictions of the first two sex-specific 
mechanisms that greater female representation will improve policing outcomes for violent 
crimes against women, and particularly for domestic violence, but will not affect 
outcomes for other crimes or victims. These predictions also align with the theory of 
representative bureaucracy in political science positing that demographic diversity among 
public sector employees (passive representation) shifts policy outcomes to benefit the 
minority group (active representation).
20
 By contrast, the third mechanism about officer 
quality is not specifically related to gender and is compatible with either improvements or 
deteriorations in policing quality for female and male victims of violent crimes and other 
crimes. We accommodate this third possible mechanism, and the potential quality 
tradeoffs between victims, by also assessing quality outcomes for assaults against men and 
property crimes. However, without direct evidence on officer characteristics, we will not 
be able to directly study the third mechanism. Findings of positive effects that are limited 
to violence against women and domestic violence escalation will support the conclusion 
that first two mechanisms are present in our data, but will not be enough to definitively 
rule out changes in officer quality under the third mechanism.  
 
 
III. Main Data Sources and Variables 
This section describes our data sources and procedures for constructing our two main 
outcome variables–crime reporting and intimate partner homicides–and our main 
explanatory variable for the female officer share. Summary statistics are reported in Table 
1. The control variables, other outcomes, and AA data are described in the text as they 
appear in Sections 4 through 6.    
A. Data on Crime Reporting  
Our data source for crime reporting is the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), 
conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) since 1973. Specifically, we use the 
NCVS files for the 40 largest MSAs in the country, available starting in 1979 (US 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2007).
21
 This survey provides unique 
data on crime incidents, reported or unreported to police, on a nationally representative 
sample of about 40,000 to 50,000 housing units. Household members 12 and older are 
interviewed regarding crime incidents twice a year for 3 consecutive years. Participants 
are asked screening questions for possible crimes. Any question that elicits a positive 
response is followed by additional questions that gather details about the nature of the 
incident, including whether it was reported to the police. Crimes include both completed 
and attempted assault, robbery, purse snatching, pickpocketing, burglary, and theft. 
Changes to the survey in 1992, aimed at addressing complaints that the survey was not 
gathering complete information about sexual assaults and domestic violence, limit the 
 
20 See Keiser at el. (2002) for theoretical foundations and evidence on the link between active and passive 
sex representation in the educational sphere and Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) for a summary and 
evidence in the case of female police officers and rape.   
21 These data are publicly available to researchers through the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data 
(NACJD) at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Data are only for the 
core counties within each MSA.  
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comparability with later years, so we focus on crimes before 1991.
22
 We focus on this 
earlier period primarily because that is the period of the initial and more rapid growth in 
female police representation. It also predates the federal VAWA of 1994, the landmark 
policy on the topic that could affect our outcomes (other policy changes during our sample 
period are discussed in Section 4.1). The main limitation of focusing on this period, 
however, is that we are not able to consider reporting of rape and sexual assaults. Prior to 
the re-design, the NCVS contained no specific screening questions about sexual assaults 
(though respondents could offer information about rapes and attempted rapes in response 
to the general question about assaults).  
Although victimization studies provide crucial information that is not available in police 
reports, crime may still be underreported in these surveys. In particular, scholars have 
noted the lower implied incidence rates of domestic violence in the NCVS as compared to 
the VAWA survey (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000) and argued that survey methods might be 
a cause. We are unable to explicitly account for this source of underreporting in our 
sample (lacking data, for example, about the sex of the interviewer or mode of interview). 
The estimated effects should properly be interpreted as reflecting incidents of the type that 
would be reported in the NCVS.  
B.  Data on Intimate Partner Homicides  
Data on homicides come from the Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) within the 
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program (United States Department of Justice 2009). 
The main limitation of the UCR for measuring crime incidence is that only crimes 
reported to police are included.
23
 This can lead to biased estimates for crimes with 
changing reporting rates, but should not be a concern for homicides. Among homicides, 
we use information on the relationships between victims and offenders to identify intimate 
partner homicides (in which the victim was a current or former spouse, girlfriend or 
boyfriend of the offender).
24
 The SHR include information on the relationships between 
victims and offenders starting in 1977. Because we are especially interested in the initial 
period of female integration, we use homicide data starting in 1977. However, to avoid 
potential confounding effects related to local policy changes in anticipation (or as a result) 
of the VAWA, we end the sample period in 1991. Because our model incorporates a one-
year lag between domestic violence reporting and homicides, this end year is consistent 
with the end year of 1990 in the analysis of NCVS data on reporting rates.  
Our main outcome variable is the county-year IPHRate, computed by dividing the 
intimate partner homicide (IPH) count for adult victims (age 18 or older or missing age) 
 
22 Major changes to the survey included adding multiple questions and cues about crimes committed by 
family member, intimates and acquaintances and about rapes and sexual assaults as well as broadening the 
scope of covered sexual incidents (rape, attempted rape, verbal threats, unwanted sexual contact without 
force). See <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/NCVS/redesign.jsp> and   
<http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncsrqa.pdf> for more information about the break in the series in 
1992 associated with the NCVS re-design.   
23 Another concern about UCR data relates to incomplete reporting by police. For example, as noted in 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), several states do not report any murders in some years. Our analysis excludes 
observations from states that report no murders for the entire state that year as we believe that these cases 
reflect missing data. They are Florida between 1988 and 1991; Rhode Island in 1977 and 1979; Maine in 
1987; Kentucky in 1988; and Maine and Iowa in 1991.  
24 We exclude homosexual relationships from our definition of intimate partners. These homicides are rare 
in the data (between 3 and 5 cases per year nationally for female victims and 38 to 72 for male victims) and 
including them has negligible effects on the estimates. In cases with multiple victims, we use the relationship 
with the first victim (the only one in the data). For multiple offenders, we count the crime if there had been an 
intimate relationship between the victim and any of the offenders. 
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by the population in the county. Using the county (rather than state) as our main 
geographic unit allows us to examine relationships with the local shares of female officers. 
The county also provides a larger and more stable geographic unit than the police 
department’s service area and is more comparable across locations and over time.25 IPH is 
relatively rare and most counties report none in most years (87% of observations for male 
victims and 82% for female victims; Table 1). We reduce the share of observations with 
zero IPH deaths (to 40% for male victims and 24% for female victims) by restricting our 
estimation sample to the largest counties, with over 150,000 in population in every year of 
the sample period. This restriction also helps address the concern that our estimates might 
otherwise be unduly influenced by large fluctuations in IPH rates from small changes in 
IPH counts among small counties.
26
 We also use the SHR data to compute the total 
number of non-intimate partner homicides by sex in each county-year, which we use as a 
control for overall violent crime rates in an expanded estimation model. 
C.  Data on Police Demographics  
Our primary data source for police employment information is the Law Enforcement 
Officers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA) file within the UCR. This file contains counts of 
officers and civilians of each sex at each reporting police department. We create aggregate 
employment measures at the MSA-level for the reporting analysis and county level for the 
IPH analysis. Our key explanatory variable, FemaleOfficerShare, is the ratio of the 
weighted numbers of female officers to total officers, where we weight departments based 
on the size of the population they serve (a variable in the UCR).
27
 This measure accounts 
for the fact that the departments within a geographical area that serve larger populations 
and have larger numbers of sworn officers are more likely to be the relevant departments 
for crime victims. For falsification checks, we also define the variable 
FemaleCivilianShare in an analogous manner using the weighted counts of civilian 
employees. In creating these measures, we noted a few outliers that are clearly data entry 
errors, and before aggregating the data, replaced them with interpolated values.
28
  
Over the period of our analysis, the FemaleOfficerShare variable increases dramatically 
in both estimation samples: going from 5% to 13% in the crime victimization sample and 
from 3% to 10% in the sample of large counties used for the IPH analysis (Table 1, Panel 
C). Nevertheless, the great majority of police officers are male throughout the sample 
period. For example, the female share of officers is under 27% across all county-year 
observations in the IPH sample and under 11% in 90% of observations. The estimates in 
this paper therefore reveal the effects of integrating female officers to a limited degree and 
are not likely to apply equally to increases in female officer shares to equal representation 
 
25 Repeating the main IPH specifications at the police department level for the largest departments (serving 
populations above 75,000 in all years) also yields similar results for the OLS analysis in Section 5 and the IV 
analysis in Section 6 (Online Appendix Table 7A). 
26 The results are also robust to alternative population cutoffs. For example, Column 1 of Online Appendix 
Table 3A reports estimates with a population threshold of 50,000 that are similar to the main estimates.  
27 When different departments serve the same (city or county) population we first merge their data by 
summing the numbers of officers and civilians of each gender. 
28 The complete list is as follows. In 1977 and 1979, the number of female civilian employees reported for 
the NYPD is zero even though in the years before and after it is above 1,500. Also at the NYPD, the number 
of female officers is zero in 1979 even though it is 294 in the year before and 539 in the year after. In no other 
year in our sample period is there as large a change in the number of female officers that is then reversed. In 
the St. Louis Police Department in 1981, the number of female officers is reported as 358, which is more than 
5 times as many as in the years before or after. In each of these cases, we replaced the suspect values with the 
average from the two adjacent years. 
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or beyond. 
IV. Effects of Female Officers on Crime Reporting 
Our first outcome variable is the rate at which violent crimes are reported to police. We 
test the prediction from the first two hypotheses in Section 2 that female officer shares 
will increase crime reporting by female, but not male, victims. We start with reporting 
because it captures a key input in the police production function and the trigger for 
intervention.
29
 Reporting rates also proxy for the trust that victims have in police. Despite 
its importance, crime reporting has rarely been studied as an outcome in the economics 
literature.
 
  
A.  Estimation and Results for Crime Reporting 
This section presents estimates of the effects of female officer representation on crime 
reporting rates from fixed effects models. Our empirical specification starts with the 
following form: 
 
(1) CrimeReportedijt =  βSFFemaleOfficerSharejt + βXijt + αj + τt + εijt 
 
The unit of observation is a crime incident and the outcome CrimeReportedijt is an 
indicator variable set to 1 if crime i, committed in geographic area (MSA) j and year t, 
was reported to police. The main explanatory variable, FemaleOfficerSharejt, is the female 
share among officers in that locality and year; αj and τt are fixed effects for MSA and year; 
and Xijt is a set of controls for victim demographics, crime features and public policies. 
We estimate linear probability models using ordinary least squares and find that nearly all 
of the predicted values of the outcome fall within the range from zero to one. To allow for 
arbitrary serial correlation and correlated errors across victims within an MSA, we cluster 
standard errors at the MSA level.  
Using a sample comprising all assaults against women, we first estimate the basic fixed 
effects model with no additional covariates in Column 1 of Table 2. The coefficient of 
1.04 on FemaleOfficerShare indicates that each percentage point increase in female 
officer share in an MSA is associated with an equal percentage point increase in crime 
reporting by female assault victims in that MSA: a sizable increase in reporting when 
considered in absolute terms or relative to average reporting rates for female assault 
victims (49%; Table 1). In this table, as in the remaining tables in the paper, we only 
report estimates for the main variables of interest; tables with coefficients for all control 
variables can be found in Online Appendix B. 
In Columns 2 to 4 of Table 2, we report estimates from models that add increasing sets 
of control variables. Our choice of controls is motivated by previous research on crime 
reporting and incidence of violence against women. The first factor we consider is 
women’s educational and economic progress in an area, which could affect both female 
labor supply in policing and also domestic violence rates (Aizer 2010) and reporting 
decisions. Column 2 includes controls for female educational and labor market outcomes 
 
29 Buzawa and Buzawa (1996; pp. 76-77) argue that reporting of domestic violence to police was important 
even before the VAWA reforms, as it was associated with lower rates of future violence: they interpret this as 
evidence that even the “classic” police response helped reduce repeated victimization. We discuss escalation 
of domestic violence and repeated violence in the next section. More recent evidence on the importance of 
reporting is in Carrell and Hoekstra (2012), which finds benefits from reporting of domestic violence to 
authorities that extend to exposed children and their peers at school.  
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(mean earnings, the fraction employed, and average years of schooling) at the MSA level 
from the Current Population Surveys (CPS; King et al. 2010)
30
 and controls for individual-
level information about the victim’s race (Black), ethnicity (Hispanic), and education 
(years of schooling and an indicator for missing values) from the NCVS. We also control 
for increasing female empowerment during the period as measured by the female share of 
workers in non-traditional professional occupations, defined, as in Bailey, Hershbein and 
Miller (2012) to exclude nursing and teaching, at the MSA level. Another factor addressed 
in Column 2 is the potential correlation between female integration in law enforcement 
and state or local policy reforms aimed at improving police handling of violence against 
women. The landmark national policy on the issue, the 1994 VAWA, was enacted after 
our sample period and does not directly affect our estimates. However, earlier policy 
changes could have affected outcomes in our sample period, and are therefore included as 
controls. Specifically, we account for policies aimed at domestic violence or shown in the 
literature to have affected its incidence or severity: funds for police training awarded 
under the 1984 Family Violence Prevention Services Act (Newmark, Harrell and Adams 
1995); a state-year level control for the generosity of welfare benefits based on the 
maximum AFDC payment to a single mother with two children (Nou and Timmins 2005); 
and state-year level controls for unilateral divorce laws (Dee 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers 
2006), mandatory arrest laws (Iyengar 2009), and no-drop prosecution policies (Aizer and 
Dal Bó 2009).
31
 Although several of these covariates are related to reporting rates, their 
inclusion reduces the main estimate by only a small amount.
 
  
Starting in Column 3, we categorize crime incidents based on the relationship between 
the victim and offender. We define the variable Domestic as an indicator for intimate 
partner violence, in which the attacker (or one of the attackers in case of multiple 
offenders) is a current or former spouse or boyfriend of the victim’s. This applies to 18 
percent of the observations in the sample of assaults against women. There are only 142 
domestic violence cases with male victims in the NCVS (constituting 1.5% of all assaults 
against male victims) and so we are unable to examine reporting rates for them. We 
exclude these cases and thus, in practice, the Domestic variable is defined only for female 
victims. Because the policies listed above are mainly expected to affect reporting for 
domestic violence cases, we also add interaction terms between each of the policies and 
Domestic. The negative interaction effect between Domestic and no-fault divorce (in 
Online Appendix Table 2B) could mean that battered wives are less likely to report abuse 
to police if they can obtain a divorce easily without asserting it as a cause. Interestingly, 
we find a negative estimate for police training programs, but only for non-intimate partner 
violence.
32
 Column 4 adds incident-level controls for additional crime characteristics from 
the NCVS: crime severity, its interaction with attempted versus completed status, and 
indicators for multiple offenders and an offender that was known to the victim but was not 
 
30 When data are not available for the MSA we use the data for the state (weighted by county population in 
cases where the MSA includes counties from more than one state). We follow this procedure with other 
variables (such as policy reforms) that are only available (or defined) at the state level.  
31 Aizer and Dal Bó (2009) study the 50 largest cities in the US. Using their data, we coded each MSA (or 
county, in Section 5) as having a no-drop policy if any city within that MSA had one. We assigned values of 
zero for cities not included in Aizer and Dal Bó (2009).  
32 Although it is important to include these policy controls to rule out possible confounding effects, our 
estimates for these policies may not be representative of their full or long-term effects. This is particularly true 
for mandatory arrest laws, which are very rare in our sample. The only states with such laws in place by 1990 
are Connecticut, Iowa, Missouri, and Nevada and only Missouri affects our MSA sample. While No-drop 
policies were more prevalent, they affected less than 8% of the observations in our MSA sample and only 88 
domestic violence cases. Another criminal justice policy that changed in recent decades in the spread of 
“three-strikes” laws mandating long sentences, but these policies do not vary in our sample.   
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their intimate partner.
33
 Our main estimate remains stable. 
In the final column of Table 2, we explore the prediction from Section 2.2 that reporting 
of domestic violence will be especially responsive to female officer shares. We find strong 
confirmation of this prediction in the large (1.16) and significant positive coefficient on 
the interaction term between the domestic violence indicator and the female share. The 
estimates in Column 5 indicate that a 7.4 percentage point increase in the female officer 
share (corresponding to the increase in average female officer share over the sample 
period; Table 1) increases reporting of intimate partner violence by 13.6 percentage points 
(5.1 + 8.5) and reporting of other assaults against female victims by a more modest 5.1 
percentage points.  
In contrast to these strong relationships for female assault victims and female officers, 
we do not detect significant relationships for male assault victims, or female civilian 
shares, or for the civilian share among police employees.  
We estimate the relationships for male victims in part as falsification checks implied by 
the first two gender-specific mechanisms in Section 2, in part to test for overall effects on 
officer quality under the third mechanism, and in part to assess tradeoffs that may exist in 
improving quality for different types of crimes. The lack of an effect for male victims 
(Table 3, Column 1) indicates that increases in the female share of officers do not deter 
male victims from turning to the police or harm the general perceptions of local police 
quality.  It shows that the increase in reporting in Table 2 is specific to female victims and 
not caused by changes in overall trust in police or reporting propensities among all victims 
of violent crimes. This pattern fits the predictions of the two gender-based mechanisms 
discussed in Section 2 but is less consistent with the third mechanism relating to changes 
in officer quality.  
The remaining columns in Table 3 show that the increase in reporting is related to the 
increase in female officer representation in particular, and not related other features of 
police employment. Columns 2 and 3 show that the female share among civilian police 
employees does not predict increased reporting of violence against women (in general or 
for domestic violence).
34
 Similarly, the results in Columns 4 and 5 rule out effects of 
another change in police employment during the period, namely, the increase in the 
civilian share among police employees (which would affect the overall female share 
because civilian employees are far more likely to be female; see Table 1). Taken together, 
the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 show that the meaningful relationship is between female 
officer shares and reporting by female assault victims.   
In Table 4, we incorporate the main estimates for women and the falsification check for 
men into an expanded version of the model that we estimate on a pooled sample of assault 
victims of both sexes. Thus, we estimate a model of the form: 
 
 
 
 
33 Felson et al. (2002)’s examination of victims’ stated reasons for reporting or not reporting domestic 
violence charts their complex motivations and concerns. On the one hand, domestic violence victims often 
perceive their assaults as more serious than assault by strangers because of the higher chance of recurrence. 
On the other hand, they feel heightened privacy concerns that inhibit reporting.  
34 Using police employment data from confidential EEO-4 reports (obtained from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission), and using linear interpolation to fill in missing years (data are only available for 
1977, 1980, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989, and 1989 in our sample period) we also investigated incremental effects 
of increasing the share of female officers in higher ranks (in the professional or managerial job categories; see 
discussion in Miller and Segal 2012). However, we did not find consistent and statistically significant 
differential effects beyond increasing the female share among all sworn officers. Researchers interested in 
obtaining access to EEOC data should contact Ronald Patrick Edwards. 
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(2) CrimeReportedijt =  βSFFemaleOfficerSharejt + βSF_F Female×FemaleOfficerSharejt                         
                                       + βSF_D Domesic×FemaleOfficerSharejt  + βXijt + αj + τt + εijt 
 
 
The insignificant coefficient on FemaleOfficerShare reflects the lack of an effect for 
male victims (similar to the model in Column 1 of Table 3, but with the restriction that the 
controls have the same coefficients for men and women, and with additional interactions 
between policies and Domestic). The main variable of interest is the product 
Female×FemaleOfficerShare, which measures the increase in reporting by female victims 
relative to male victims when the female officer share increases. This interaction is 
positive and significant (in Column 1), which confirms the first result of Table 2. Because 
the expanded model includes reporting rates for male victims as a counterfactual for 
unobservable changes in local factors that affect reporting rates for all victims, the shift to 
a comparison by victim sex enables us to include a richer set of fixed effects. The effect of 
female officers remains substantial in predicting reporting of crimes against female 
victims (relative to male victims) with a complete set of MSA by year fixed effects 
(Column 2). The large and significant coefficients on Domestic×FemaleOfficerShare in 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 show that the second main finding of Table 2, a substantially 
larger impact of female officers on reporting of domestic violence, is also confirmed in the 
comparisons with male victims (with either MSA and year fixed effects or MSA by year 
fixed effects).  
In the same spirit as the comparison by victim sex, we also test an alternative 
identification strategy that compares the effects of female officer shares on crime 
reporting of violent versus property crimes, using a pooled sample of assaults against 
female victims and burglaries (defined as unlawful or forcible entry or attempted entry of 
a residence that usually, but not always, involves theft or attempted theft) of households 
with female members (aged 12 or older). We find similar results (reported in Online 
Appendix Table 1A) using the property crime counterfactual for local trends in reporting 
propensities. The female officer share is significantly related to reporting of assaults, and 
particularly domestic violence, against female victims, but not to reporting of burglaries. 
The absence of an effect of female officers on property crimes again suggests that the 
third mechanism, from overall changes in officer quality, is less important than the first 
two. As with the male-female comparison, the inclusion of MSA by year fixed effects 
does not alter these results. 
B. Alternative Hypotheses for Reporting Results 
The results in the previous section paint a consistent picture of female officers increasing 
reporting of violent crimes against women, but they may not capture the casual effect of 
female officers if police departments made other changes that would increase reporting 
around the same time that they hired more women. This section explores, and reports 
evidence against, the main possible alternatives that could generate changes in policing 
contemporaneous with increased female representation, but not caused by it.  
One possibility is that female shares are related to department size. This would happen if 
all departments equally wanted to hire more women, but growing departments were able 
to do so more rapidly and extensively. Because it is possible that having more officers per 
population could increase reporting (if police are less time-constrained and more visible 
and available to citizens), we include this variable as an additional control in our main 
models (from Columns 1 and 3 in Table 4). The officers per population variable has no 
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independent effect on reporting rates for male or female assault victims overall and the 
estimates from the expanded model in Column 1 of Table 5 show no change in the 
Female×FemaleOfficerShare estimates (Panels A and B) or the interaction 
Domestic×FemaleOfficerShare (Panel B). 
The next alternative we consider is that police departments increased their hiring of 
female officers specifically to handle an increase in assaults against women reported to 
them. In that case, the increase in female representation would properly be an outcome 
rather than an explanatory variable, and our estimates would likely be biased upward (if 
trends in reporting continued). We address this concern by computing the annual rates of 
reported assaults (total or domestic violence) per population by victim sex and MSA using 
the NCVS data. Adding these values, lagged by one year, as controls in our model does 
not affect the main estimates for Female×FemaleOfficerShare or 
Domestic×FemaleOfficerShare (Column 2 of Table 5).
35
 Similarly, Column 3 shows the 
stability of our estimates to adding controls for the previous year’s homicide rates in the 
MSA. Intimate partner and non-intimate partner homicides are included separately. The 
former is not related to reporting; the latter has a positive association.  
In the next column of Table 5, we consider the possibility that changes in female officer 
shares are related to the severity or nature of crime in the local area. The concern here is 
that MSAs with more homicides or that are more affected by the crack epidemic are less 
likely to hire female officers and also have lower crime reporting rates for assaults and 
domestic violence. Column 4 shows the stability of our main estimates in a model that 
includes the current period non-intimate partner homicide rate and the Fryer et al. (2013) 
city-level index for the crack cocaine epidemic in that year.
36
  
In Column 5 of Table 5, we revisit the issue of changing gender attitudes that may 
increase both female representation in law enforcement and reporting of crimes against 
female victims. The robustness of the main estimates to controls for the victim’s own 
education and local area controls for female education, employment, and average earnings, 
as well as the female share in non-traditional occupations, argues against an overall story 
about female empowerment. We confirm this further by expanding the model to include 
measures of sexist attitudes held by men and women (at the Census-region and year level) 
from the General Social Surveys (Smith, Marsden and Hout 1979-2010).
37
 We find 
significant associations between sexist attitudes and crime reporting, but the main 
estimates are not affected by these new controls. Column 6 shows the results are also 
robust to including all of the extra controls from Table 5 in a single model. 
The final alternative hypothesis we consider is that departments hired more female 
officers at the same time that they established designated units for domestic violence cases 
or victim assistance or that they instituted policies for handing domestic disturbances. This 
is related to the hypothesis examined in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 that increased 
reporting of crimes against women triggered the desire to hire more female officers, but 
does not require a specific trigger from previous cases. Instead, the reason may have been 
 
35 In a separate analysis, we also find no evidence to support the idea that female officer shares tend to 
increase after increased reporting of these crimes. 
36  These data were downloaded from <http://scholar.harvard.edu/fryer/publications/measuring-crack-
cocaine-and-its-impact> on March 9, 2012. For each MSA we use the value for the largest city in that MSA. 
Two MSAs (Nassau-Suffolk and West Palm Beach-Boca Raton) have no city data, so we use the state values 
(for NY and FL, respectively). The index starts in 1980; we use 1980 values for the years before 1980.  
37 Specifically, we created indicator variables for negative responses to each of the questions: “If your party 
nominated a woman for President, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job?” and “Do you 
approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband 
capable of supporting her?” The sexism variable is the sum of these indicators (so higher values represent 
more sexism). Values are interpolated linearly for years in which data are unavailable. 
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random (local political pressure), but as long as the increase in female representation was 
contemporaneous with the institution of other programs, our estimates will capture both 
the effects of female officers and the effects (if any) of those programs. Our main data 
sources do not allow us to consider this question directly, so we use data on local police 
departments from the two earliest waves of the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS; US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
1987, 1990) surveys. 
Using the balanced panel of departments surveyed about these programs in 1987 and 
1990, we test for any associations between the programs and the female employment 
shares at the department, after controlling for year and department fixed effects and the 
size of the department (measured by numbers of officers and civilians) and of the 
population served. The results, reported in Panel A of Table 2A in the Online Appendix, 
show no significant individual associations between the individual programs – having a 
designated unit for domestic violence or victim assistance (overall or full-time), or having 
a formal policy for handling domestic disturbances – and female employment shares. 
Columns 1 and 2 show this for female officer shares and Columns 3 and 4 do this for 
female civilian shares. The F-tests on the joint significance of the programs also fail to 
reject the hypothesis of no association. Panel B of the table confirms the lack of an 
association using alternative measures for the programs of interest. Columns 1 and 3 use 
an indicator for having any program (to further address concerns that adoption of the 
different programs may be correlated) and Columns 2 and 4 have indicators for having 1, 
2 or 3 programs (with the omitted group being no programs) to capture variation in 
program intensity. The absence of significant associations (and inconsistent signs of the 
relationships), as well as the results in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, likely reflects the fact 
that hiring female officers was not widely advocated as means to improve police 
responses to violence against women during our sample period. In fact, the 1994 federal 
VAWA has no specific provisions related to female officers.
38
 
The results in Table 5 and Online Appendix Table 2A provide additional support for 
interpreting the estimates in Section 4.1 as reflecting the impact of increasing the female 
share of officers.
39
 We provide further support for this interpretation in Section 6 when we 
instrument for the female share of officers using externally-imposed AA. Before turning 
to those estimates, we first measure the relationship between female officers and domestic 
violence escalation rates.  
 
 
38 The only parts of Public Law 103-322 (the law that contains the VAWA) that relate to female officers in 
particular are the requirements (in Sec. 1702) that departments applying for Title I grants “provide assurances” 
that they will “to the extent practicable, seek, recruit, and hire members of racial and ethnic minority groups 
and women in order to increase their ranks within the sworn positions in the law enforcement agency” and (in 
Sec. 200107) that states participating in the Title XX Police Corps program “make special efforts to seek 
and recruit applicants from among members of all racial, ethnic or gender groups.” The main provisions of the 
VAWA relate to: federal penalties for sex crimes and federal grants for crime prevention, victim assistance 
programs (including establishment of the national hotline and support for shelters and community-based 
programs), promotion of policies that increase domestic violence arrests, and training and educational 
programs (for police, prosecutors, judges, court personnel). The VAWA also includes new data collection, 
research and confidentiality requirements, and modifies evidentiary rules for sex offense cases.  
39 In separate regressions, we also confirmed the robustness of the results to the tests in Table 5 using the 
identification approach in Equation (1) on the sample of only female victims (used in Table 2).  
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V. Effects of Female Officers on Domestic Violence Escalation  
Having uncovered a strong relationship between female officers and domestic violence 
reporting in the previous section, we now examine the effects of this improved contact 
with police on the escalation of violence between intimate partners. If police intervention 
is generally effective at reducing escalation rates, then we should expect to find lower 
escalation rates resulting from the increase in reporting induced by female officers. We 
expect further reductions in escalation if the likelihood or the quality of the police 
response improves with additional female officers. Alternatively, if officer quality 
diminishes as the female share increases, even the positive effects on crime reporting may 
not translate into lower crime rates and could even increase escalation if police 
involvement triggers retaliation. Motivated by this theoretical ambiguity, and the policy 
importance of preventing escalation, we examine the empirical relationship between 
female police representation and domestic violence escalation in this section. Our primary 
measure of escalation captures the extreme negative outcome of intimate partner homicide 
while our secondary measure captures repeated incidents of domestic violence reported in 
the NCVS. 
A. Estimation and Results for Intimate Partner Homicides 
We examine the relationship between female officer representation and intimate partner 
homicide rates using an empirical specification of the following form: 
 
(3) IPHRatesjt =  βSFFemaleOfficerSharej,t-1 + βXj,t-1 + γZj,t  + αj + τt + εsjt 
 
The unit of observation is a county-year and the outcome IPHRatesjt is the number of 
intimate partner homicides (IPH) per 100,000 population in county j and year t with 
victims of sex s. In keeping with the literature on intimate partner homicides, we 
separately consider both male and female victims.
40
 Because the mechanism for the 
hypothesized effect (preventing escalation of violence) is expected to occur over time, we 
use the previous year’s female share among police officers in the county as our main 
explanatory variable.  
We control for potentially confounding factors by including covariates, also lagged by 
one year, that capture economic conditions (for both sexes, to account for potential 
victims and offenders, available at the state-year level in the CPS)
41
 and the same public 
policies used in the reporting analysis in Section 4. We account for potential differences in 
domestic violence escalation and reporting rates by county size and race with controls for 
lagged county population and lagged population share White. We also follow the literature 
on crime outcomes and control for the lagged value of number of police officers per 
 
40 The reason that improved policing of domestic violence against women is expected to reduce homicide 
rates for male victims is that battered women sometimes kill their abusers in self-defense or in defense of their 
children (Saunders 2002). Justifiable homicides are included in the SHR data we study, though they are not 
included in summary totals of homicides published from the UCR. In addition, although our reporting 
estimates in Section 4 are limited to female domestic violence victims, it is worth noting that male victims of 
domestic violence often report very low satisfaction with the police. Therefore, it is possible male victims of 
domestic violence would find female officers more compassionate or more likely to take them seriously (as in 
the first mechanism in Section 2), which could increase reporting and reduce escalation for male victims as 
well. We are unable to examine reporting rates for domestic violence with male victims in the NCVS because 
there are only 142 such cases in our sample. 
41 Before 1977, the CPS data only identify large states separately. For counties in smaller states in 1976, we 
use the mean values for their state group. 
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population. Together, these lagged controls compose Xj,t-1. αj and τt are county and year 
fixed effects. We estimate the IPH rate model in levels, and not the logarithmic or log-
odds transformations sometimes used in crime rate regressions because of the relative 
infrequency of IPH: even in our preferred estimation sample of large counties, about 40% 
of all county-year observations have zero IPH counts for male victims. In all regressions, 
we cluster standard errors at the county level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation and 
weight observations using the county population.  
Across the range of specifications in Table 6, we find a negative and significant 
relationship between the previous year’s female share of officers in the county and the 
current year’s IPH rates for both female (Panel A) and male (Panel B) victims. Column 1 
shows estimates from the fixed effects model without covariates, estimated on a sample of 
all counties with population over 150,000 for every year in the sample period (1977 to 
1991). The coefficients imply that a 6 percentage point in increase in the female officer 
share (corresponding to the increase in the average female officer share over the sample 
period; Table 1) leads to a decline of 0.087 deaths per 100,000 population for women (a 
13.8 percent decline relative to the sample mean of 0.63 in 1977; Table 1) and 0.13 for 
men (22.2 percent of the mean rate of 0.60 in 1977). Column 2 reports similar estimates 
after including the basic set of control variables.  
The estimates in Column 3 are from our preferred specification, which includes the 
contemporaneous controls in Zj,t: the county’s non-intimate partner homicide rate (similar 
to Aizer 2010) and the (state-level) crack cocaine index (Fryer et al. 2013) to account for 
county-specific changes in overall violent crime rates.
42
 Column 4 then adds region-by-
year fixed effects (for each of the nine Census divisions) to account for arbitrary time 
trends in unobservable region-specific factors. The inclusion of all of these controls has 
only minor effects on the main estimates, increasing the magnitude of the coefficient for 
female victims to −1.5 and decreasing it for male victims to −1.8.  
Online Appendix Table 3A reports additional robustness checks that confirm the main 
estimates. The main coefficients are very similar (slightly larger for female victims) when 
the model is estimated without population weights (Column 2; compare to Column 3 of 
Table 6). This consistency across weighting schemes suggests that the model is well-
specified and effects are relatively homogeneous over our sample (Solon, Haider and 
Wooldridge 2013). The remaining columns of the table show significant negative effects 
of female officers on the number of IPH deaths (Column 3) and the natural logarithm of 
the IPH death rate (which excludes county-year observations with zero deaths; Column 4) 
and from a Tobit specification for the main outcome, the IPHRate (Column 5). Finally, 
the placebo test in Column 5 of Table 6 (in the spirit of the test in Column 2 of Table 3) 
finds no significant association between the female share among civilian police employees 
and intimate partner homicide rates for victims of either sex.
43
 
This evidence indicates that the change in the sex composition of law enforcement 
during the late 1970s and 1980s had a meaningful impact on reducing the ultimate 
escalation of domestic violence, possibly because of the substantial increase in reporting 
rates and changes in police officer behavior. The finding of statistically significant effects 
on IPH rates for victims of both sexes, and not only for women, is also present in Iyengar 
 
42 We use the state-level values of the crack index for the county-level analysis to include all counties. As 
mentioned above, because the crack index starts in 1980, we use 1980 values for the years before 1980.   
43 When we repeat the placebo test from Column 4 of Table 3 using the lagged share of civilian workers, 
we also find it to be uncorrelated with IPH rates.  
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(2009).
44
 That feature of the results is nevertheless notable for our sample period when 
IPH rates were initially similar between the sexes (the 1977 rates are 0.63 and 0.60 for 
women and men, respectively), but constituted very different shares of total homicides 
(about 33 percent for women and less than 9 percent for men). During our sample period, 
IPH rates also declined much more for men (to 0.29 in 1991, less than 3 percent of all 
homicides with male victims) than for women (to 0.58 in 1991).  
B.  Estimation and Results for Repeated Intimate Partner Violence 
The results of the previous sub-section show a strong link between increased female 
officer shares and lower homicide rates related to domestic violence. In this sub-section, 
we present evidence on an intermediate outcome that captures a potential channel for this 
effect. In particular, using NCVS data, we focus on women who report experiencing 
domestic violence at least once in the sample period. The question that we ask is if the 
female share of officers in the area at the time of each incident affects the likelihood of the 
woman being assaulted again by an intimate partner during her period of participation (up 
to 3 years) in the NCVS.
45
  
Building on the regression framework used for reporting in Section 3 (Equation 1), we 
alter the dependent variable from CrimeReported to RepeatOffense and estimate this 
equation: 
  
(4)     RepeatOffenseijt =  βSFFemaleOfficerSharejt + βXijt + αj + τt + εijt 
 
The sample includes all domestic violence offenses (intimate partner assaults with 
female victims) and the new outcome captures future offenses after the current one.
46
 The 
main explanatory variable is still FemaleOfficerSharejt, the female share of police officers 
in the area. We start by using the controls for individual, incident, and local area factors 
(as these can affect both reporting rates and repeat violence) from the reporting 
regressions in Section 4. Then, we add the crime controls used in the previous section 
(i.e., officers per population, population, crack index, and non-intimate homicides in the 
MSA, and the economic conditions of males in the MSA). As above, standard errors are 
clustered at the MSA level to allow for arbitrary correlations across incidents and over 
time within the MSA. 
We find a negative and significant effect of the female officer share in determining the 
likelihood that a domestic violence offense is repeated while the respondent is in the 
survey. The size of this estimate is meaningful: a 7 percentage point increase in female 
officers (the overall increase in the NCVS sample) is associated with a 23 percentage 
point reduction in repeated domestic violence rates (in Columns 1 and 2 of Online 
Appendix Table 4A for the basic model and model with additional crime controls).  
A possible concern with these estimates is that domestic abuse that occurs after 
individuals exit from the NCVS sample is not observed. The estimates will be not be 
biased by random variation in the timing of abuse relative to the end of the household’s 
 
44 Aizer and Dal Bó (2009) only find statistically significant effects for male victims. Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2006) find significant IPH effects for female victims and statistically significant intimate partner 
violence effects for “severe violence” against male victims. 
45 For individuals interviewed after 1987 our measure of future domestic violence assaults includes those 
occurring after 1990 (as long as they are reported in the NCVS).   
46 When multiple domestic violence incidents are reported against a single victim within the same month, 
we use the record number variable (RECSEQ) to define a unique order, assuming that lower numbers are 
assigned to earlier incidents.      
21 
 
sampling window. However, attrition before the end of the 3-year sampling window can 
be related to female officer shares. Attrition is a meaningful indicator of reduced 
escalation if it is caused by women leaving their abusive partners. If attrition is instead 
caused by couples or families moving together because of factors (like increased police 
intervention) related to increased female officer shares, the negative estimates may not 
reflect actual reductions in domestic violence assaults. We address this concern by 
restricting the sample to observations of households interviewed at least once more after 
the focal domestic violence incident. The conclusions are unchanged (Column 3 of Online 
Appendix Table 4A). Thus, the results of this exploratory analysis support the relevance 
of one channel for the effect of female officers on IPH rates, namely, preventing ongoing 
violence and escalation within households. 
It is natural to ask if NCVS data can also be used to investigate the effects of female 
officer share on rates of violent crimes across MSAs and over time. We report estimates in 
Online Appendix Table 5A. Column 1 reports a negative and significant effect for overall 
domestic violence rates, consistent with the escalation results in this section. However, the 
small sample of total domestic violence incidents (1,146 observations, on average fewer 
than 3 observations per MSA-year) may not produce reliable measures of aggregate 
trends. We consider other violent crimes in Columns 2 and 3 of the table, but again, these 
aggregate estimates may be unreliable because of the small numbers of underlying 
observations. We find insignificant effects of female officer on total assaults for either 
female or male victims. Online Appendix Table 6A reports estimates using UCR data on 
rapes and assaults reported to police. In addition to the limitation that increased reporting 
rates will inflate crime rates, these data are not sufficiently detailed to identify assaults 
against women (until 2012, the definition of rape required a female victim) or domestic 
abuse. Though the point estimates are negative, we find no statistically significant effects 
of female officer shares on reported rapes or assaults. When considered alongside the 
increase in reporting by female assault victims (and no change for male victims), the UCR 
estimates do suggest that increasing female officer shares lead to declines in overall rates 
of assaults. They do not suggest the presence of overall officer quality effects or tradeoffs.  
 
 
VI. Effects of Affirmative Action on Police Quality 
This section revisits the results of the previous two sections using an alternative 
identification approach that focuses on increased female representation induced by 
externally imposed AA. As discussed above, these estimates have the potential advantage 
of being more reliably identified than the estimates in the previous sections, but they may 
also reflect a different underlying relationship if AA itself has direct effects on police 
quality, separate from the effects of increased female officer shares. The reasons for direct 
effects, discussed in Section 2, include a possible drop in average officer quality or greater 
opposition from male officers, when the female officer share is increased under external 
pressure.  
We base our AA exposure measures on the legal database in Miller and Segal (2012).
47
 
Our key variable of interest is YearsAAOn, defined as the difference between the current 
 
47 We did need to modify the legal database in Miller and Segal (2012) slightly for this paper.  First, we 
limited the sample to county and municipal departments (excluding state police). Second, after confirming (as 
in Miller and Segal 2012) that the share of female officers increases after litigation, even without externally 
imposed AA plans, we grouped these departments in the AA group. If we repeat the regressions treating the 
litigated only departments separately, the results for AA are essentially identical. Third, we added 3 previously 
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year and the start year of AA (or litigation year for cases that did not lead to explicit 
plans) for the earliest plan in the area (MSA or county). YearsAAOn does not continue to 
accrue additional years of AA exposure after the AA end date of the latest plan. We 
include all litigation based on employment discrimination and the resulting AA plans. It is 
important to note that these cases are all based on employment discrimination, specifically 
related to hiring, promotion or termination practices; the cases are not about police 
misconduct or other civil rights violations.  Including the full set of plans provides useful 
variation in the database, but may cause us to under-estimate the impacts of AA that is 
targeted on female employment. Finally, because the Miller and Segal (2012) legal 
database covers only the largest 429 police departments (479 including state police), it 
does not include all of the departments used the current analysis. We assign zero years of 
exposure to departments with no information, which may also bias our estimates 
downwards if we are treating some litigated departments as un-litigated.  
In order to produce estimates that are comparable to those in the prior sections, we 
implement our alterative identification approach by estimating IV versions of the 
equations presented in the previous sections (Equation 2 for reporting, Equation 3 for IPH 
rates, and Equation 4 for repeated domestic violence), instrumenting for the main 
explanatory variable of FemaleOfficerShare, and in Equation 2, for its interactions with 
female victim and domestic violence indicators, with years of AA exposure (YearsAAOn) 
and the appropriate interaction terms. The samples and controls are unchanged from those 
described in Sections 4 and 5.  
For each estimation sample, we first confirm the first stage impact of AA exposure in 
increasing female officer shares found in Miller and Segal (2012). These estimated 
coefficients on the YearsAAOn variable are all positive and highly statistically significant. 
In the crime reporting sample in Table 7, the coefficient is 0.0025, with a cluster-robust 
standard error of 0.00068 (t-statistic of 3.7 and F-statistic of 13.8). The first stage estimate 
is similarly positive and significant on the sub-sample of domestic violence incidents used 
to measure repeated abuse Online Appendix Table 4A (coefficient of 0.0029, cluster-
robust standard error 0.00077, t-statistic of 3.8 and F-statistic of 14.2, for YearsAAOn in 
Column 4). Each additional year of AA is also linked to a significant increase in the 
female officer share in the IPH sample in Table 8, where the coefficient on lagged 
YearsAAOn is 0.0031, with a cluster-robust standard error of 0.00047 (t-statistic of 6.6 and 
F-statistic of 43.5). These strong test results for the effects of AA exposure on female 
officer shares suggest that weak instrument bias is unlikely to be driving our IV 
estimates.
48
 We also confirmed that all of the main results are unchanged in sign and 
                                                                                                                                                  
excluded departments to the AA group: Santa Ana (CA), Orange County (FL), and Detroit (MI). Santa Ana 
and Orange County were excluded from Miller and Segal (2012) because the protected group was based on 
ethnicity, which is not a basis for exclusion in this paper. The Detroit Police Department had a well-known 
(and litigated for reverse discrimination) voluntary race-based plan that was not externally-imposed for the 
study of Black employment. The department also operated under externally-imposed plans for female 
employment during the sample period (e.g. Schaefer v. Tannian). Because our focus here is on gender, rather 
than race, we include Detroit in the AA group.  
48 Furthermore, all of our models are just-identified, with the same number of instruments as endogenous 
variables, which also limits concerns about weak instruments. Because there is no clear-cut procedure for 
testing for weak instrument bias in the case of non-i.i.d. errors, we are not able to conduct formal tests on our 
sample. For the case of clustered standard errors, in addition to the single-equation F-statistics reported in the 
text, we computed the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics that also take into account the number of 
endogenous variables: these values are around 40 for the IPH models in Table 8, 5 to 7 for the reporting 
models in Table 7, and 14 in the repeated domestic violence model in Table 4A. However, there is no 
theoretical basis for applying the Stock and Yogo (2002) critical values derived for the i.i.d. case or even 
applying the “F > 10 rule of thumb.” Across all of our models, the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic, computed 
assuming i.i.d. errors, is always above 100 and well above the Stock-Yogo critical values (when such values 
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significance in reduced form versions of the models, which provides further reassurance 
that bias from weak instruments is not the source of the significant IV estimates reported 
below.
49
 
Our IV estimates for crime reporting outcomes (in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7) are 
qualitatively unchanged from our OLS estimates. The IV models use our preferred 
identification approach, in which male assault victims provide counterfactuals, 
corresponding to the OLS models in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 4. In the IV models, we 
instrument for the three potentially endogenous variables (FemaleOfficerShare, and 
interactions with Female, and Domestic) with three AA variables (YearsAAOn, 
Female×YearsAAOn, and Domestic×YearsAAOn). The IV coefficients imply a 1 
percentage point AA-induced increase in female officer shares increases reporting of all 
assaults against women by 1.3 percentage points (statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level) and increases reporting of domestic violence assaults by 4.5 percentage points (1.3 
+ 3.2, statistically significant at the 1 percent level).  
The reductions in IPH rates from OLS models in Table 6 are also repeated in the IV 
models in Table 8. These IV estimates are from the same county-year sample (with more 
than 150,000 population in the sample period). The IV estimate for lagged 
FemaleOfficerShare in the IPH regression for female victims is −4.1 (standard error of 
1.4; Column 2) in the basic model (corresponding to the model in Column 1 of Table 6) 
and −3.1 (standard error of 1.6; Column 3) in the expanded model with additional crime 
controls and region-by-year fixed effects. Similarly for male IPH victims, the IV estimate 
is −4.2 in the basic model (Column 4) and −3.9 in the expanded model (Column 5). In 
addition to supporting the OLS findings for the main outcomes, the corresponding IV 
model also confirms the results of the exploratory analysis presented in Section 5.2 on 
repeated domestic violence as a channel for the escalation results. The estimates are 
reported in Online Appendix Table 4A. Column 5 reports the IV estimate of −8.1 
(standard error of 3.4) for FemaleOfficerShare in the main equation for repeated 
violence.
50
  
One potential concern about the IV analysis based on years of AA exposure is that AA 
itself might have occurred following increasing trends in female officer shares (reflecting 
trends in female labor supply) or in domestic violence reporting or incidence. We consider 
this potential explanation by testing for spurious placebo effects of AA in the years before 
AA starts, first, using an expanded reduced form version of our parametric model with 
separate linear trends for the years before and after AA, and second, in a non-parametric 
model that allows for arbitrary non-linear trends around AA.  
Neither type of analysis suggests that effects of AA reflect the continuation of 
preexisting trends. In the parametric reduced form analyses of crime reporting IPH rates 
and repeated domestic abuse, the years after AA variables (YearsAAOn and interactions 
with victim sex and crime type for the crime reporting models) are always statistically 
significant (and share the same sign as the IV estimates) but the years before AA variables 
never are. This pattern tightens the empirical link between AA implementation and the 
main outcomes of interest. 
                                                                                                                                                  
are available, which is not the case for the model with 3 endogenous variables and 3 instruments used in 
Column 2 of Table 7).  
49 As discussed, for example, in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2010), reduced form estimates are unbiased 
even when instruments are weak.  
50 Similar to the OLS estimates, Online Appendix Table 5A also reports a marginally significant (at the 
10.1% level) reduction in domestic violence (but no effects on total assaults) incidence using NCVS data and 
Online Appendix Table 6A reports negative but statistically insignificant declines in reported rapes and 
assaults. Section 5.2 describes the data limitations that apply to these estimates.  
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The non-parametric analyses allow us to explore trends in outcomes in the years 
immediately preceding and following AA initiation, without imposing a linear relationship. 
We depict the results in Figures 1 and 2, for the NCVS and IPH samples, respectively. 
Each curve plots the set of point estimates for indicator variables for small groups of years 
before or after AA starts. We generally use 2-year bins, but use 4-year bins to avoid small 
cell sizes in the repeated abuse sample for observations more than 2 years from the 
litigation date. The figures show several patterns. First, for all of the outcomes, they 
confirm the lack of pre-trends from the linear model in the years closest to AA. Second, 
they support the general pattern of increasing effects with more years of AA exposure. 
The figures also show that female officer shares were not growing faster in departments 
before they were sued for discrimination. In the crime reporting sample, there appears to 
be a relative decline in female office shares before AA that is reversed under AA.
51
 
Across all of the outcomes explored in this paper, the AA estimates are always 
consistent in sign and significance with the OLS estimates and generally larger in 
magnitude. The falsification analyses in Sections 4 and 5 indicate that the reason for the 
difference is not that the OLS estimates are biased by correlations with omitted variables. 
Instead, the larger IV estimates may result from heterogeneous treatment effects. One 
reason that the average effect of AA-induced growth might be larger is if increases in the 
share of female officers have a larger impact on departments with recent histories of 
employment discrimination. Another potential reason for the larger IV magnitudes is 
measurement error police employment (as discussed in McCrary and Chalfin 2013).  
In either case, the consistency of the results between estimation approaches strengthens 
the causal interpretation of the evidence in this paper that female officers improved police 
quality for female assault victims and victims of intimate partner violence. It also shows 
that quality improvements were achieved even when the increase in female representation 
was a result of external pressure. These results provide empirical evidence that AA can 
improve quality in certain circumstances, as suggested by recent laboratory experiments, 
such as Niederle, Segal and Vesterlund (2013) that finds that gender-based AA increases 
the willingness of highly qualified women to enter competitions. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
This paper studies the effects of female integration in the traditionally male dominated 
occupation of law enforcement in US localities between the late 1970s and early 1990s. 
Using national panel data on crime victimization and homicide reports from the 
Department of Justice, and a variety of identification strategies, we estimate the effects of 
increasing the female share of officers on police quality related to violence against women 
and domestic violence. Our primary quality measures capture two key dimensions: crime 
reporting rates and domestic violence escalation. We find that increasing female shares 
among officers, but not among civilian police employees, improves outcomes along both 
dimensions. Our investigations of other crimes and victims uncover no significant effects 
of female officers on overall assaults or reported rapes. All of the findings are robust to 
studying increases in female officer shares induced by exposure to externally imposed AA. 
The results may be attributable to gender differences in officer preferences or productivity. 
They provide new evidence that an aspect of police employment policy affects the 
 
51  Separate estimates also reveal no apparent effect of AA exposure on the share of women in non-
traditional occupations in the area, in either parametric or non-parametric models, which tightens the link 
between AA and police employment. 
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behavior of crime victims and potential offenders.  
Our results also suggest that police departments will respond more effectively to sexual 
assault and domestic violence cases if they continue to hire female officers and ensure that 
victims are able to request that those officers conduct their interviews and handle their 
cases. Although this paper does not directly examine the effects of policies or staffing 
procedures within departments that affect the assignment of female officers to assault 
cases for certain victims, our findings of overall effects of increasing female officer shares 
provide evidence supporting the presence of the underlying mechanism that motivates 
such policies. To the extent that these results apply outside of the US context, they may 
also support initiatives to hire more female officers as part of broader efforts to reduce 
violence against women, such as those recently undertaken in India (e.g., Crilly 2013).  
Finally, our finding of quality improvements from externally imposed AA does more 
than provide an alternative identification strategy for estimating of the overall effects of 
female officers. First, it suggests that AA in employment can help members of protected 
groups other than those directly affected. The finding also implies that the equilibrium 
share of female officers at police departments targeted for interventions was sub-optimal, 
at least with respect to the outcomes examined in this paper. Our finding of improvements 
in these outcomes from the AA-based models shows that increasing female representation 
is still effective when achieved through externally imposed plans or quotas. Police 
departments operating under these plans may not have been convinced of the merits of 
hiring more women. Nevertheless, their outcomes improved along several key dimensions.  
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Figures 
Figure 1: Changes in Female Officer Shares, Repeated Domestic Violence, and Sex Differences in Violent 
Crime Reporting around Affirmative Action Initiation 
 
 
Notes: The figure depicits point estimates for two-year bins before and after affirmative action initiation 
(litigation year is the omitted category) for crime reporting and female officer shares from regression models 
estimated on the NCVS sample of violent crimes. Crime reporting estimates are for interactions between year 
bins and an indicator for either female victims of any violent crimes or of domestic violence. Male domestic 
violence victims are omitted from the sample. The estimates for the female share of officers are multiplied by 
10 for readability. Repeated DV estimates are from the subsample of DV incidents; because of smaller cell 
sizes, we use 4 year bins for incidents more than 2 years before or after the litigation year.  
 
Figure 2: Changes in Female Officer Shares and Intimate Partner Homicide Rates around Affirmative 
Action Initiation 
 
 
Notes: The figure depicits point estimates for two-year bins before and after affirmative action initiation 
(litigation year is the omitted category) from regression models estimated on the county-year panel of intimate 
partner homicide (IPH) rates per 100,000 population. The estimates for the female share of officers are 
multiplied by 10 for readability. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
 
Panel A: Fraction of Assaults Reported to the Police 
  All Male Female Female Domestic 
Fraction reported 1979 - 1990 0.44 0.41 0.49 0.55 
 1979 0.43 0.42 0.46 0.48 
 1990 0.44 0.38 0.54 0.69 
Observations  15, 319 9,037 6,282 1,146 
Source: NCVS MSA Sample. Years: 1979-1990. Unit of observation is a crime incident.  
 
Panel B: Intimate Partner Homicides (IPH) 
  Counties with 
population above 
150,000 in all years 
All counties 
  Male Female Male Female 
IPH per Population 1977-1991 0.442 0.633 0.402 0.566 
 1977 0.598 0.631 0.536 0.569 
 1991 0.287 0.576 0.270 0.530 
Observations with Zero IPH 
[Population-Weighted Fraction]  
 1,494   
[0.26] 
881  
[0.13] 
39,209   
[0.49] 
37,258 
 [0.38] 
Counties  255 255 3,084 3,084 
Observations  3,732 3,732 45,032 45,032 
Source: Supplemental Homicide Reports. Years: 1977-1991. Unit of observation is a county-year. 
 
Panel C: Police Employment 
 Reporting Sample  IPH Sample 
 All 1979 1990 All 1976 1990 
Female Officer Share 0.086 0.053 0.127 0.063 0.032 0.095 
Female Civilian Share 0.648 0.627 0.677 0.656 0.608 0.686 
The “Reporting Sample” is the sample of all assaults (against male and female victims) used in Panel A 
above. The “IPH Sample” is the sample of counties in Panel B above with population above 150,000 in all 
years. 
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Table 2: Female Officer Shares and Crime Reporting by Female Assault Victims 
 
Dependent variable: Was the crime reported to police? (Yes = 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           
Female Officer Share 1.047** 0.950** 0.990** 0.931** 0.691* 
 [0.479] [0.449] [0.446] [0.419] [0.386] 
Domestic × Female Officer Share 
    
1.155** 
 
    
[0.458] 
      
MSA and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Victim and Local Area Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic Indicator and Interactions No No Yes Yes Yes 
Crime Controls No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,282 6,282 6,282 6,282 6,282 
R2 0.018 0.026 0.030 0.065 0.065 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-level in brackets.  
The Domestic indicator is set to 1 if the victim is female and offender is the victim’s current or former 
husband or boyfriend. Assaults against male victims by intimate partners (n=142 observations) are excluded 
from the sample. Victim Controls are: Black, Hispanic, Years of Schooling, and Missing Education. Local 
Area Controls are: Divorce Law, Mandatory Arrest Law, Police Training, No-Drop Policy, Maximum AFDC 
Benefits, Mean Earnings (MSA-Gender), % Employed (MSA-Gender), and Mean Years of Schooling (MSA-
Gender), share female in nontraditional occupations (MSA). Domestic Interactions are with: Divorce Law, 
Mandatory Arrest Law, Police Training, No-Drop Policy, and Maximum AFDC Benefits (to a single mother 
with 2 children). Crime Controls are: Multiple Offenders, Known (Not-Domestic) Offender, Attempted 
Attack, Completed Simple Assault with Injury, Attempted/ Completed Aggravated Assault or Rape, and 
Attempted×Attempted/Completed Aggravated Assault or Rape. 
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Table 3: Falsifying Exercises for Crime Reporting by Male and Female Assault Victims 
 
Dependent variable: Was the crime reported to police? (Yes = 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Male Female Female Female Female 
           
Female Officer Share -0.175 
     [0.523] 
    Female Civilian Share  
 
-0.010 0.012 
   
 
[0.102] [0.112] 
  Domestic × Female Civilian Share 
  
-0.121 
   
  
[0.151] 
  Share Civilians 
   
0.213 0.211 
 
   
[0.234] [0.236] 
Domestic × Share Civilians 
    
0.014 
 
    
[0.200] 
 
     MSA and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Victim, Crime, and Local Area Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic Indicator and Interactions No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,037 6,282 6,282 6,282 6,282 
R2 0.089 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-level in brackets.  
The Domestic indicator is set to 1 if the victim is female and offender is the victim’s current or former 
husband or boyfriend. Assaults against male victims by intimate partners (n=142 observations) are excluded 
from the sample. See Table 2 notes for variables in Victim, Crime, and Local Area Controls, and Domestic 
Interactions. 
 
Table 4: Comparisons by Victim Sex of Crime Reporting by Assault Victims 
 
Dependent variable: Was the crime reported to police? (Yes = 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Female Officer Share 0.080 
 
0.059 
  [0.427] 
 
[0.422] 
 Female × Female Officer Share 0.838*** 0.778** 0.657** 0.618** 
 [0.291] [0.293] [0.280] [0.288] 
Female × Domestic × Female Officer Share 
  
1.089** 1.004** 
 
  
[0.457] [0.455] 
 
    MSA and Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
MSA × Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
Victim and Crime Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic Indicator and Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local Area Controls Yes  No  Yes  No  
Observations 15,319 15,319 15,319 15,319 
R2 0.068 0.098 0.068 0.098 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-level in brackets. 
The Domestic indicator is set to 1 if the victim is female and offender is the victim’s current or former 
husband or boyfriend. Assaults against male victims by intimate partners (n=142 observations) are excluded 
from the sample. See Table 2 notes for variables in Victim, Crime, and Local Area Controls, and Domestic 
Interactions. 
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Table 5: Testing Alternative Hypotheses for Increased Reporting 
 
Dependent variable: Was the crime reported to police? (Yes = 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             
Panel A: Assault Reporting   
 
     
 
Female Officer Share 0.157 0.240 0.224 0.292 0.122 0.479 
 
[0.449] [0.440] [0.372] [0.400] [0.409] [0.437] 
Female × Female Officer Share 0.836*** 0.699** 0.796*** 0.838*** 0.806*** 0.726** 
 [0.291] [0.281] [0.283] [0.279] [0.288] [0.296] 
 
     
 
R2 0.068 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.071 
 
     
 
Panel B: Assault and Domestic Violence Reporting 
      
 
Female Officer Share 0.131 0.216 0.202 0.269 0.101 0.442 
 
[0.442] [0.438] [0.369] [0.397] [0.405] [0.434] 
Female × Female Officer Share 0.657** 0.473* 0.593** 0.645** 0.628** 0.491* 
 [0.280] [0.269] [0.271] [0.265] [0.277] [0.271] 
Female × Domestic × Female Officer Share 1.079** 1.309** 1.197** 1.150** 1.075** 1.366*** 
 
[0.454] [0.488] [0.461] [0.464] [0.460] [0.499] 
      
 
R2 0.068 0.070 0.068 0.069 0.068 0.072 
 
     
 
MSA and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Victim, Crime and Local Area Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic Indicator and Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Police Officers per Population Yes No No No No Yes 
Lagged Reported Assaults and Domestic 
Rates 
No Yes No No No Yes 
Lagged IPH and Non-IPH Homicide Rates No No Yes No No Yes 
Current Non-IPH Homicide Rate No No No Yes No Yes 
Crack Index (linear and squared) No No No Yes No Yes 
Male and Female Sexism in Region  No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 15,319 13,669 15,206 15,143 15,319 13, 493 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-level in brackets. 
The Domestic indicator is set to 1 if the victim is female and offender is the victim’s current or former husband or 
boyfriend. Assaults against male victims by intimate partners (n=142 observations) are excluded from the sample. Column 
2 and 6 omit observations missing lagged reported assaults and domestic violence rates; Columns 3, 4 and 6 omit 
observations with missing homicide data (for Florida in 1988 to 1990). See text for details about the sexism and crack 
index. See Table 2 notes for variables in Victim, Crime, and Local Area Controls, and Domestic Interactions. 
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Table 6: Female Officer Shares and Intimate Partner Homicide Rates 
 
Dependent variable: Intimate Partner Homicides per 100,000 population  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: Female Victims 
     
 
Lagged Female Officer Share -1.446*** -1.474*** -1.544*** -1.528***  
 
[0.382] [0.395] [0.408] [0.393]  
Lagged Female Civilian Share 
    
-0.059 
     
[0.073] 
      
R2 0.562 0.566 0.569 0.588 0.567 
      
Panel B: Male Victims 
     
 
Lagged Female Officer Share -2.202*** -2.096*** -2.271*** -1.812***  
 
[0.587] [0.605] [0.581] [0.578]  
Lagged Female Civilian Share  
    
0.023 
     
[0.096] 
      
R2 0.607 0.617 0.622 0.652 0.617 
      
County and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census Region (9)×Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes No 
Lagged Local Area Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Non-IPH Homicide Rate and Crack Index No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,732 3,732 3,732 3,732 3,732 
Number of Counties 255 255 255 255 255 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets. 
Sample is restricted to counties with population above 150,000 in all years. Observations are weighted by 
county population. The non-IPH homicide rate control is for female victims in Panel A and male victims in 
Panel B.  See text for details about the crack index. Local Area Controls are: Officers per Population, County 
Population, White Population Share, Maximum AFDC Benefits (to a single mother with 2 children), Divorce 
Law, Mandatory Arrest Law, Police Training, No-Drop Policy, Mean Male Earnings, Male % Employed, 
Male Years of Schooling, Mean Female Earnings, Female % Employed, Female Years of Schooling, share 
female in non-traditional occupations. 
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Table 7: Affirmative Action Estimates of Crime Reporting by Assault Victims 
 
Dependent variable: Was the crime reported to police? (Yes = 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 First Stage 
Dep. Var.: 
Share 
Female 
Officers 
IV IV 
       
Years of AA Exposure 0.003***   
 [0.001]   
Female Officer Share 
 
-1.021 -0.961 
 
 
[1.199] [1.174] 
Female × Female Officer Share 
 
1.913** 1.334* 
 
 
[0.846] [0.751] 
Female × Domestic × Female Officer Share 
 
 3.230** 
 
 
 [1.312] 
 
 
 
 MSA and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  
Victim, Crime and Local Area Controls Yes Yes Yes  
Domestic Indicator and Interactions Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 15,319 15,319 15,319 
R2 0.900   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-level in brackets.  
The Domestic indicator is set to 1 if the victim is female and offender is the victim’s current or former 
husband or boyfriend. Assaults against male victims by intimate partners (n=142 observations) are excluded 
from the sample. See Table 2 notes for variables in Victim, Crime, and Local Area Controls, and Domestic 
Interactions. 
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Table 8: Affirmative Action Estimates of Intimate Partner Homicide Rates  
 
Dependent variable: Intimate Partner Homicides per 100,000 population  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
First Stage 
Dep. Var.: 
Share 
Female 
Officers 
IV IV IV IV 
Victim Sex  Female Female Male Male 
      
Years AA On 0.003***     
 [0.000]     
Lagged Female Officer Share  -4.177*** -3.137* -4.273** -3.959*** 
  [1.404] [1.617] [1.745] [1.467] 
      
County and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census Region (9) ×Year Fixed 
Effects 
No No Yes No Yes 
Non-IPH Homicide Rate and Crack 
Index No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Local Area Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,732 3,732 3,732 3,732 3,732 
R2 0.856     
Number of Counties 255 255 255 255 255 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets.  
Sample is restricted to counties with population above 150,000 in all years. Observations are weighted by 
county population. The non-IPH homicide rate control is for female victims in Columns 2 and 3 and for male 
victims in Columns 4 and 5.  See text for details about the crack index. See Table 6 notes for variables in 
Local Area Controls. 
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